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Abstract
We present a paradigm for extensible lexicon development based on Lexical Conceptual Structure to support social engineering detection
and response generation. We leverage the central notions of ask (elicitation of behaviors such as providing access to money) and framing
(risk/reward implied by the ask). We demonstrate improvements in ask/framing detection through refinements to our lexical organization
and show that response generation qualitatively improves as ask/framing detection performance improves. The paradigm presents a
systematic and efficient approach to resource adaptation for improved task-specific performance.
Keywords: resource adaptation, social engineering detection, response generation, NLP based bots for cyber defense
1. Introduction
Social engineering (SE) refers to sophisticated use of de-
ception to manipulate individuals into divulging confiden-
tial or personal information for fraudulent purposes. Stan-
dard cybersecurity defenses are ineffective because attack-
ers attempt to exploit humans rather than system vulnera-
bilities. Accordingly, we have built a user alter-ego appli-
cation that detects and engages a potential attacker in ways
that expose their identity and intentions.
Our system relies on a paradigm for extensible lexicon de-
velopment that leverages the central notion of ask, i.e.,
elicitation of behaviors such as PERFORM (e.g., click-
ing a link) or GIVE (e.g., providing access to money).
This paradigm also enables detection of risk/reward (or
LOSE/GAIN) implied by an ask, which we call framing
(e.g., lose your job, get a raise). These elements are used
for countering attacks through bot-produced responses and
actions. The system is tested in an email environment, but
is applicable to other forms of online communications, e.g.,
SMS.
Email Ask Framing
(a) It is a pleasure to inform you
that you have won 1.7Eu. Con-
tact me. (jw11@example.com)
PERFORM
contact
(jw11@...)
GAIN
won
(1.7Eu)
(b) You won $1K. Did you send
money? Do that by 9pm or lose
money. Respond asap.
GIVE
send
(money)
LOSE
lose
(money)
(c) Get 20% discount. Check
eligibility or paste this link:
http.... Sign up for email alerts.
PERFORM
paste
(http...)
GAIN
get
(20%)
Table 1: LCS+ Ask/Framing output for three SE emails
More formally, an ask is a statement that elicits a be-
havior from a potential victim, e.g., please buy me a
gift card. Although asks are not always explicitly stated
(Drew and Couper-Kuhlen, 2014; Zemel, 2017), we dis-
cern these through navigation of semantically classified
verbs. The task of ask detection specifically is tar-
geted event detection based on parsing and/or Semantic
Role Labeling (SRL), to identify semantic class triggers
(Dorr et al., 2020). Framing sets the stage for the ask, i.e.,
the purported threat (LOSE) or benefit (GAIN) that the so-
cial engineer wants the potential victim to believe will ob-
tain through compliance or lack thereof. It should be noted
that there is no one-to-one ratio between ask and framing in
the ask/framing detection output. Given the content, there
may be none, one or more asks and/or framings in the out-
put.
Our lexical organization is based on Lexical Conceptual
Structure (LCS), a formalism that supports resource con-
struction and extensions to new applications such as SE de-
tection and response generation. Semantic classes of verbs
with similar meanings (give, donate) are readily augmented
through adoption of the STYLUS variant of LCS (Dorr
and Voss, 2018) and (Dorr and Olsen, 2018). We derive
LCS+ from asks/framings and employ CATVAR (Habash
and Dorr, 2003) to relate word variants (e.g., reference
and refer). Table 1 illustrates LCS+ Ask/Framing output
for three (presumed) SE emails: two PERFORM asks and
one GIVE ask.1 Parentheses () refer to ask arguments, of-
ten a link that the potential victim might choose to click.
Ask/framing outputs are provided to downstream response
generation. For example, a possible response for Table 1(a)
is I will contact asap.
A comparison of LCS+ to two related resources shows that
our lexical organization supports refinements, improves
ask/framing detection and top ask identification, and yields
qualitative improvements in response generation. LCS+ is
1To view our system’s ask/framing outputs on a larger
dataset (the same set of emails which were also used
for ground truth (GT) creation described below), refer to
https://social-threats.github.io/panacea-ask-detection/data/case7LCS+AskDetectionOutput.txt.
deployed in a SE detection and response generation sys-
tem. Even though LCS+ is designed for the SE domain,
the approach to development of LCS+ described in this pa-
per serves as a guideline for developing similar lexica for
other domains. Correspondingly, even though development
of LCS+ is one of the contributions of this paper, the main
contribution is not this resource but the systematic and ef-
ficient approach to resource adaptation for improved task-
specific performance.
2. Method
In our experiments described in Section 3., we compare
LCS+, our lexical resource we developed for the SE
domain, against two strong baselines: STYLUS and
Thesaurus.
STYLUS baseline: As one of the baselines for our
experiments, we leverage a publicly available resource
STYLUS that is based on Lexical Conceptual Structure
(LCS) (Dorr and Voss, 2018) and (Dorr and Olsen, 2018).
The LCS representation is an underlying representa-
tion of spatial and motion predicates (Jackendoff, 1983;
Jackendoff, 1990; Dorr, 1993), such as fill and go,
and their metaphorical extensions, e.g., temporal (the
hour flew by) and possessional (he sold the book).2
Prior work (Jackendoff, 1996; Levin, 1993; Olsen, 1994;
Chang et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2010; Kipper et al., 2007;
Palmer et al., 2017) has suggested that there is a close re-
lation between underlying lexical-semantic structures of
verbs and nominal predicates and their syntactic argument
structure. We leverage this relationship to extend the ex-
isting STYLUS verb classes for the resource adaptation to
SE domain through creation of LCS+ which is discussed
below.
For our STYLUS verb list, we group verbs into four lists
based on asks (PERFORM, GIVE) and framings (LOSE,
GAIN). The STYLUS verb list can be accessed here:
https://social-threats.github.io/panacea-ask-detection/resources/original_lcs_classes_based_verbsList.txt.
Examples of this classificationare shown below (with total
verb count in parentheses):
• PERFORM (214): remove, redeem, refer
• GIVE (81): administer, contribute, donate
• LOSE (615): penalize, stick, punish, ruin
• GAIN (49): accept, earn, grab, win
Assignment of verbs to these four ask/framing categories
is determined by a computational linguist, with approx-
imately a person-day of human effort. Identification of
genre-specific verbs is achieved through analysis of 46
emails (406 clauses) after parsing/POS/SRL is applied.
As an example, the verb position (Class 9.1) and the verb
delete (Class 10.1) both have an underlying placement or
existence component with an affected object (e.g., the cur-
sor in position your cursor or the account in delete your
account), coupled with a location (e.g., here or from the
2LCS is publicly available at
https://github.com/ihmc/LCS.
system). Accordingly, Put verbs in Class 9.1 and Remove
verbs in Class 10.1 are grouped together and aligned with
a PERFORM ask (as are many other classes with similar
properties: Banish, Steal, Cheat, Bring, Obtain, etc.). Anal-
ogously, verbs in the Send and Give classes are aligned
with a GIVE ask, as all verbs in these two classes have a
sender/giver and a recipient.
Lexical assignment of framings is handled similarly, i.e.,
verbs are aligned with LOSE and GAIN according to their
argument structures and components of meaning. It is as-
sumed that the potential victim of a SE attack serves to
lose or gain something, depending on non-compliance or
compliance with a social engineer’s ask. As an example,
the framing associated with the verb losing (Class 10.5) in
Read carefully to avoid losing account access indicates the
risk of losing access to a service; Class 10.5 is thus aligned
with LOSE. Analogously, the verb win (Class 13.5.1) in
You have won 1.7M Eu. is an alluring statement with a
purported gain to the potential victim; thus Class 13.5.1
is aligned with GAIN. In short, verbs in classes associ-
ated with LOSE imply negative consequences (Steal, Im-
pact by Contact, Destroy, Leave) whereas verbs in classes
associated with GAIN imply positive consequences (Get,
Obtain).
Some classes are associated with more than one
ask/framing category: Steal (Class 10.5) and Cheat
(Class 10.6) are aligned with both PERFORM (redeem,
free) and LOSE (forfeit, deplete). Such distinctions are not
captured in the lexical resource, but are algorithmically
resolved during ask/framing detection, where contextual
clues provide disambiguation capability. For example,
Redeem coupon is a directive with an implicit request
to click a link, i.e., a PERFORM. By contrast, Avoid
losing account access is a statement of risk, i.e., a LOSE.
The focus here is not on the processes necessary for
distinguishing between these contextually-determined
senses, but on the organizing principles underlying both, in
support of application-oriented resource construction.
LCS+ resource for SE adapted from STYLUS: Setting
disambiguation aside, resource improvements are still
necessary for the SE domain because, due to its size and
coverage, STYLUS is likely to predict a large number of
both true and false positives during ask/framing detection.
To reduce false positives without taking a hit to true
positives, we leverage an important property of the LCS
paradigm: its extensible organizational structure wherein
similar verbs are grouped together. With just one person-
day of effort by two computational linguists (authors on the
paper; the algorithm developer, also an author, was not in-
volved in this process), a new lexical organization, referred
to as “LCS+” is derived from STYLUS, taken together
with asks/framings from a set of 46 malicious/legitimate
emails.3 These emails are a random subset of 1000+
emails (69 malicious and 938 legitimate) sent from an
3It should be noted that this resource adaptation is based on
an analysis of emails not related to, and without access to, the
adjudicated ground truth described in section 3. That is, the 46
emails used for resource adaptation are distinct from the 20 emails
used for creating adjudicated ground truth.
external red team to five volunteers in a large government
agency using social engineering tactics. Verbs from these
emails are tied into particular LCS classes with matching
semantic peers and argument structures. These emails
are proprietary but the resulting lexicon is released here:
https://social-threats.github.io/panacea-ask-detection/resources/lcsPlus_classes_based_verbsList.txt.
Two categories (PERFORM and LOSE) are modified from
the adaptation of LCS+ beyond those in STYLUS:
• PERFORM (6 del, 44 added): copy, notify
• GIVE (no changes)
• LOSE (174 del, 11 added): forget, surrender
• GAIN (no changes)
Table 2 shows the refined lexical organization for LCS+
with ask categories (PERFORM, GIVE) and framing cat-
egories (GAIN, LOSE). Boldfaced class numbers indicate
the STYLUS classes that were modified. The resulting
LCS+ resource drives our SE detection/response system.
Each class includes italicized examples with boldfaced
triggers. The table details changes to PERFORM and
LOSE categories. For PERFORM, there are 6 deleted
verbs across 10.2 (Banish Verbs) and 30.2 (Sight Verbs)
and also 44 new verbs added to 30.2. For LOSE, 7 classes
are associated with additions and/or deletions, as detailed
in the table.
Thesaurus baseline: The Thesaurus baseline is based on
an expansion of simple forms of framings. Specifically,
the verbs gain, lose, give, and perform, are used as search
terms to find related verbs in a standard but robust resource
thesaurus.com (referred to as “Thesaurus”). The verbs
thus found are grouped into these same four categories:
• PERFORM (44): act, do, execute, perform
• GIVE (55): commit, donate, grant, provide
• LOSE (41): expend, forefeit, expend, squander
• GAIN (53): clean, get, obtain, profit, reap
The resulting Thesaurus verb list is publicly released here:
https://social-threats.github.io/panacea-ask-detection/resources/thesaurus_based_verbsList.txt.
We also adopt categorial variations through CATVAR
(Habash and Dorr, 2003) to map between different parts
of speech, e.g., winner(N)→ win(V). STYLUS, LCS+ and
Thesaurus contain verbs only, but asks/framings are often
nominalized. For example, you can reference your gift card
is an implicit ask to examine a gift card, yet without CAT-
VAR this ask is potentially missed. CATVAR recognizes
reference as a nominal form of refer, thus enabling the iden-
tification of this ask as a PERFORM.
3. Experiments and Results
Intrinsic evaluation of our resources is based on compari-
son of ask/framing detection to an adjudicated ground truth
(henceforth, GT), a set of 472 clauses from system output
on 20 unseen emails. These 20 emails are a random sub-
set of 2600+ messages collected in an email account set up
to receive messages from an internal red team as well as
“legitimate” messages from corporate and academic mail-
ing lists. As alluded to earlier, these 20 emails are distinct
from the dataset used for resource adaptation to produc the
task-related LCS+.
The GT is produced through human adjudication and cor-
rection by a computational linguist4 of initial ask/framing
labels automatically assigned by our system to the 472
clauses. System output also includes the identification of
a “top ask” for each email, based on the degree to which
ask argument positions are filled.5 Top asks are adjudi-
cated by the computational linguist once the ask/framing
labels are adjudicated. The resulting GT is accessible here:
https://social-threats.github.io/panacea-ask-detection/data/.
The GT is used to measure the precision/recall/F of three
of three variants of ask detection output (Ask, Framing,
and Top Ask) corresponding to our three lexica: Thesaurus,
STYLUS, and LCS+. LCS+ is favored (with statistical sig-
nificance) against the two very strong baselines, Thesaurus
and STYLUS. Table 3 presents results: Recall for framings
is highest for STYLUS, but at the cost of higher false posi-
tives (lower precision). F-scores increase for STYLUS over
Thesaurus, and for LCS+ over STYLUS.
McNemar (McNemar, 1947) tests yield statistically signif-
icant differences for asks/framings at the 2% level between
Thesaurus and LCS+ and between STYLUS and LCS+.6 It
should be noted that not all clauses in GT are ask or fram-
ing: vast majority (80%) are neither (i.e., they are true neg-
atives).
We note that an alternative to the Thesaurus and LCS base-
lines would be a bag-of-words lexicon, with no organi-
zational structure. However, the key contribution of this
work is the ease of adaptation through classes, obviating
the need for training data (which are exceedingly difficult
to obtain). Classes enable extension of a small set of verbs
to a larger range of options, e.g., if the human determines
from a small set of task-related emails that provide is rele-
vant, the task-adapted lexicon will include administer, con-
tribute, and donate for free. If a class-based lexical orga-
nization is replaced by bag-of-words, we stand to lose ef-
ficient (1-person-day) resource adaptation and, moreover,
training data would be needed.
A first step toward xtrinsi evaluation is inspection of
responses generated from each resource’s top ask/framing
pairs. Table 1 (given earlier) shows LCS+ ask/framing pairs
whose corresponding (T)hesaurus and (S)TYLUS pairs are:
(a) T: None, None
S: None, GAIN/won(1.7Eu)
(b) T: PERFORM/do(that), LOSE/lose(money)
S: GAIN/won(money), GIVE/send(money)
4The adjudicator is an author but is not the algorithm devel-
oper, who is also an author.
5Argument positions express information such as the ask type
(i.e. PERFORM), context to the ask (i.e. financial), and the ask
target (e.g., “you” in “Did you send me the money?”).
6Tested values were TP+TN vs FP+FN, i.e., significance of
change in total error rate.
PERFORM:
9.1 Put Verbs: Position your cursor here
10.1 Remove Verbs: Delete virus from machine
10.2 Banish Verbs→5 deleted (banish, deport, evacu-
ate, extradite, recall): Remove fee from your account
10.5 Steal Verbs: Redeem coupon below
10.6 Cheat Verbs: Free yourself from debt
11.3 Bring and Take Verbs: Bring me a gift card
13.5.2 Obtain: Purchase two gift cards
30.2 Sight Verbs→1 deleted (regard), 44 added (e.g.,
check, eye, try, view, visit): View this website
37.1 Transfer of Message: Ask for a refund
37.2 Tell Verbs: Tell them $50 per card
37.4 Communication: Sign the back of the card
42.1 Murder Verbs: Eliminate your debt here
44 Destroy Verbs: Destroy the card
54.4 Price Verbs: Calculate an amount here
GIVE:
11.1 Send Verbs: Send me the gift cards
13.1 Give Verbs: Give today
13.2 Contribute Verbs: Donate!
13.3 Future Having: Advance me $100
13.4.1 Verbs of Fulfilling: Credit your account
32.1 Want Verbs: I need three gift cards
LOSE:
10.5 Steal Verbs→11 added (e.g., forfeit, lose, relin-
quish, sacrifice): Don’t forfeit this chance!
10.6 Cheat Verbs: Are your funds depleted?
17.1 Throw Verbs: Don’t toss out this coupon
17.2 Pelt Verbs: Scams bombarding you?
18.1 Hit Verbs: Don’t be beaten by debt
18.2 Swat Verbs: Sluggish market getting you down?
18.3 Spank Verbs: Clobbered by fees?
18.4 Impact by Contact: Avoid being hit by malware
19 Poke Verbs: Stuck with debt?
29.2 Characterize Verbs→16 deleted (e.g., appreciate,
envisage): Repudiated by creditors?
29.7 Orphan Verbs→5 deleted (apprentice, canonize,
cuckold, knight, recruit): Avoid crippling debt
29.8 Captain Verbs→35 deleted (e.g., captain, coach,
cox, escort): Bullied by bill collectors?
31.1 Amuse Verbs→91 deleted (e.g., amaze, amuse,
gladden): Don’t be disarmed by hackers
31.2 Admire Verbs→26 deleted (e.g., admire, exalt);
Are you lamenting your credit score?
31.3 Marvel Verbs→1 deleted (feel): Living in fear?
33 Judgment Verbs: Need to remove penalties?
37.8 Complain Verbs: Want your gripes answered?
42.1 Murder Verbs: Debt killing your credit?
42.2 Poison Verbs: Strangled by debt?
44 Destroy Verbs: PC destroyed by malware?
48.2 Disappearance: Your account will expire
51.2 Leave Verbs: Found your abandoned prize
GAIN:
13.5.1 Get: You are a winner of 1M Eu.
13.5.2 Obtain: You can recover your credit rating
Table 2: Lexical organization of LCS+ relies on Ask
Categories (PERFORM, GIVE) and Framing Categories
(GIVE, LOSE). Italicized exemplars with boldfaced trig-
gers illustrate usage for each class. Boldfaced class num-
bers indicate those STYLUS classes that were modified to
yield the LCS+ resource.
Thesaurus P R F
Ask: 0.273 0.042 0.072
Framing: 0.265 0.360 0.305
TopAsk: 0.273 0.057 0.094
STYLUS P R F
Ask: 0.333 0.104 0.159
Framing: 0.298 0.636 0.406
TopAsk: 0.571 0.151 0.239
LCS+ P R F
Ask: 0.667 0.411 0.508
Framing: 0.600 0.600 0.600
TopAsk: 0.692 0.340 0.456
Table 3: Impact of lexical resources on ask/framing detec-
tion: Thesaurus, STYLUS, LCS+
(c) T: None, GAIN/get(20%)
S: PERFORM/sign(http:..), GAIN/get(20%)
Below are corresponding examples of generated responses7
for all 3 resources, based on a templatic approach that
leverages ask/framing hierarchical structure and corre-
sponding confidence scores. This module is part of a
larger, separate publication.
(a) T: How are you? Thanks.
S: ...too good to be true. What should I do?
L+: I will contact asap.
(b) T: Thanks for getting in touch, need more info.
S: Nervous about this. Your name?
L+: I would respond,8 but I need more info.
(c) T: What should I do now?
S: Website doesn’t open, is this the link?
L+: Thanks, need more info before I paste link
There are qualitative differences in these responses. For ex-
ample, in (a) Thesaurus (T) yields no asks/framings; thus a
canned response is generated. By contrast, the same email
yields a more responsive output for STYLUS (S), and a
more focused response for LCS+ (L). Similar distinctions
are found for responses in (b) and (c). Note that in the
LCS+ condition, if there is no match found using LCS+,
downstream response generation prompts the attacker (e.g.,
“please clarify”) until an interpretable ask or framing ap-
pears. In this SE task, not all responses move the conver-
sation forward. A central goal of the SE task is to waste
the attacker’s time, play along, and possibly extract infor-
mation that could unveil their identity.
4. Related Work
LCS is used in interlingual machine translation
(Voss and Dorr, 1995; Habash and Dorr, 2002), lexical
acquisition (Habash et al., 2006), cross-language informa-
tion retrieval (Levow et al., 2000), language generation
(Traum and Habash, 2000), and intelligent language
tutoring (Dorr, 1997). STYLUS (Dorr and Voss, 2018)
and (Dorr and Olsen, 2018) systematizes LCS based
on several studies (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995;
7For brevity, excerpts are shown in lieu of full emails.
8LCS+ detects both GIVE/send and PERFORM/respond.
Rappaport Hovav and Levin, 1998), but to our knowledge
our work is the first use of LCS in a conversational context,
within a cyber domain.
Our approach relates to work on conversa-
tional agents (CAs), where neural models au-
tomatically generate responses (Gao et al., 2019;
Santhanam and Shaikh, 2019), topic models produce fo-
cused responses (Dziri et al., 2018), self-disclosure yields
targeted responses (Ravichander and Black, 2018), and SE
detection employs topic models (Bhakta and Harris, 2015)
and NLP of conversations (Sawa et al., 2016). However, all
such approaches are limited to a pre-defined set of topics,
constrained by the training corpus.
Other prior work focuses on persuasion detection/ predic-
tion (Hidey and McKeown, 2018) by leveraging argument
structure, but for the purpose of judging when a persuasive
attempt might be successful in subreddit discussions ded-
icated to changing opinions (ChangeMyView). Our work
aims to achieve effective dialogue for countering (rather
than adopting) persuasive attempts.
Text-based semantic analysis for SE detection
(Kim et al., 2018) is related to our work but differs in
that our work focuses not just on detecting an attack,
but on engaging with an attacker. Whereas a bot might
be employed to warn a potential victim that an attack is
underway, our bots are designed to communicate with a
social engineer in ways that elicit identifying information.
5. Conclusions
Both STYLUS and LCS+ support ask/framing detection in
service of bot-produced responses. Intrinsically, LCS+ is
superior to both STYLUS and Thesaurus when measured
against human-adjudicated output, verified for significance
by McNemar tests at the 2% level. Extrinsically, STYLUS
supports more responsive bot outputs and LCS+ supports
more focused bot outputs.
A more general advantage of adapting LCS+ to the SE do-
main is that it can act as a guideline for developing similar
resources for other domains which will similarly support
focused outputs appropriate for particular domains. The
main contribution of this paper is not development of a par-
ticular task-specific resource, nor to suggest that LCS+ is a
generic resource for many tasks, but to present a systematic,
efficient approach to resource adaptation technique that can
generalize to other tasks for improved task-specific per-
formance, e.g., understanding viewpoints in social media
or detecting motives behind activities of political groups.
We acknowledge that our extrinsic evaluation is limited.
While we have demonstrated the efficacy of ask detection
approaches on a set of representative emails, a quantitative
evaluation is required to test the statistical significance of
our extrinsic observations. Future work is planned to con-
duct experiments with crowd-sourced workers judging the
efficacy and effectiveness of generated responses.
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